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DO BAD THINGS HAPPEN WHEN WORKS ENTER THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?:  
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION  
Christopher Buccafusco





According to the current copyright statute, in 2018, copyrighted works of music, 
film, and literature will begin to transition into the public domain. While this will 
prove a boon for users and creators, it could be disastrous for the owners of these 
valuable copyrights. Accordingly, the next few years will witness another round of 
aggressive lobbying by the film, music, and publishing industries to extend the 
terms of already-existing works. These industries, and a number of prominent 
scholars, claim that when works enter the public domain bad things will happen 
to them. They worry that works in the public domain will be underused, overused, 
or tarnished in ways that will undermine the works’ cultural and economic value. 
Although the validity of their assertions turn on empirically testable hypotheses, 
very little effort has been made to study them.  
 
This Article attempts to fill that gap by studying the market for audiobook 
recordings of bestselling novels. Data from our research, including a novel 
human subjects experiment, suggest that the claims about the public domain are 
suspect. Our data indicate that audio books made from public domain bestsellers 
(1913-22) are significantly more available than those made from copyrighted 
bestsellers (1923-32). In addition, our experimental protocol suggests that 
professionally made recordings of public domain and copyrighted books are of 
similar quality. Finally, while a low quality recording seems to lower a listener's 
valuation of the underlying work, our data do not suggest any correlation 
between that valuation and legal status of the underlying work. Accordingly, our 
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research indicates that the significant costs of additional copyright protection for 
already-existing works are not justified by the benefits claimed for it. These 
findings will be crucially important to the inevitable congressional and judicial 
debate over copyright term extension in the next few years. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 2018, for the first time in two decades, copyrighted works of art, music, 
film, and literature are scheduled to enter the public domain. This promises to be a 
huge boon to both the public, who will be able freely to access these works, and to 
creative artists who wish to perform, adapt, copy, or otherwise make use of them. 
Of course, to the owners of some of these copyrighted works, their transition into 
the public domain means the loss of millions of dollars of revenue. Book 
publishers, movie studios, and, perhaps most importantly, the Walt Disney 
Corporation will face a world where their creations are available for unauthorized 
copying and adaptation by anyone who wishes to make use of them.
1
 
Accordingly, it seems inevitable that, just as they did in the 1990s, the copyright 
industries will engage in another round of congressional lobbying to extend the 
term of protection for an additional period. 
 The standard justification for intellectual property (IP) protection is that 
the exclusive rights of copyright law provide incentives for their creators to invest 
in creating new works.
2
 Without IP protection, creations could be freely copied, 
and, in theory, creators would not be able to recoup the costs of investing in the 
new work. The primary argument in favor of extending the copyright term for yet-
to-be-created works is based on this incentive-to-create rationale:  a longer term 
                                                          
1
 Trademark law will provide Disney some relief against unauthorized uses, such as a Mickey 
Mouse doll, that are likely to confuse consumers as to the source of goods or services.  See 15 
U.S.C. §1125(a). 
2
 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW (2003). 
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means that the author will be able to generate more money from her work thereby 
increasing the ex ante incentive to create the work in the first place.
3
  
 The incentive-to-create rationale fails entirely, however, in the case of 
extending the copyright term for already existing books, music, and movies. The 
extension of protection for The Sun Also Rises does not increase the incentives for 
Hemingway to produce more or better work.
4
 He is, after all, dead.
5
 Accordingly, 
proponents of term extension have had to offer other reasons why longer 
copyrights will increase social welfare. During the adoption of the last copyright 
term extension legislation and the litigation surrounding it, the copyright 
industries and some leading scholars have put forward three justifications for 
increasing the term of protection for already existing works.  
 First, they have argued that, without additional protection, the publishing 
industries will not have sufficient incentives to preserve, protect, and 
commercialize old works. They claim that without the protections that copyright 
provides, works that fall into the public domain will be under-utilized. This is a 
version of the classic “public goods” problem in economics. Second, and in some 
ways the inverse of the first argument, proponents of term extension claim that 
works will be overused by a public with free access to them, thereby undermining 
the works’ cultural and economic value. This is a version of the “tragedy of the 
commons”: once anybody can use “Rhapsody in Blue” in a movie or a 
commercial, the song will be overused and lose its appeal. The proponents’ third 
argument claims that uncontrolled uses of culturally valuable works will tarnish 




 It has been argued that a potential author today seeing an extension of Hemingway’s copyright 
will perceived a signal that Congress will give the potential author’s works similarly gracious 
treatment in the future, thereby stimulating the potential author to produce more now.  With the 
present copyright term already at life-of-the-author plus 70 years, the “added incentive” argument 
has not been taken very seriously. See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the 
Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
5
 Hemingway Dead of Shotgun Wound; Wife Says He Was Cleaning Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
1961. 
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or debase those works, because the public’s experiences with poor quality or 
“inappropriate” versions of the works will affect their judgments about the works’ 
quality and meaning and therefore their underlying value. Audiences who see a 
substandard production of Eugene O’Neill’s The Iceman Cometh performed by 
the Evans Elementary School Drama Club may not wish to read the play or see 
another performance of it afterward and thereby never fully grasp the play’s 
treatment of anarchy and socialism.  As with the incentive-to-create rationale for 
new works, these three justifications for extending the term of protection for 
already existing works have a theoretical appeal. The important question, 
however, is whether they stand up to empirical scrutiny. We attempt to answer 
that question in this Article.  
 In recent years, legal scholars have turned increasingly to empirical and 
experimental methods to test longstanding assumptions about how laws operate. 
These methods have been particularly successful when applied to IP, because, 
unlike some areas of the law, IP law’s assumptions about markets, incentives, and 
human behavior are explicit.
6
 This Article continues our previous research 
                                                          
6
 Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher J. Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 
(2011 (hereinafter, Creativity Effect); ); Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick 
Aspirin:  An Empirical Study  of Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2533 (2011); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication:  An Empirical Study, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2011); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher J. Sprigman, Valuing 
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORN. L. REV. 1 (2010); Thomas R. Lee, et al, An 
Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
1033 (2009); Raymond Ku, Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity?  An Empirical Analysis of 
Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2009); Glynn Lunney, Patents and Growth:  
Empirical Evidence from the States, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1467 (2009); Paul J. Heald, Property Rights 
and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and 
Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1046-50 (2008) (hereinafter, Fiction 
Bestsellers); Paul J. Heald, Does the Song Remain the Same?  An Empirical Study of Bestselling 
Musical Compositions (1913-32) and Their Use in Cinema (1968-2007), 60 CASE.W. U. L. REV. 1 
(2009) (hereinafter, Musical Compositions) (songs are just as likely to be used in films after they 
fall into the public domain); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); Andrew W. 
Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One Experimental View 
of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J. L. & TECH. 138 (2011).   
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applying empirical and experimental methods to IP issues. It reports data from 
two studies that test the validity of proponents’ arguments for extending the 
copyright term. In short, we find almost no evidence to support the claims made in 
favor of copyright term extension.  
 In Part I, we describe the debate over copyright term extension and the 
rationales in favor of it. We show how these rationales affected the last term 
extension act and the litigation following it, and we discuss how they will likely 
come up again in renewed calls for extension. Part II reports on our empirical 
tests of the extension rationales. These tests rely on an interesting and 
understudied creative industry: the market for audiobook recordings of novels. 
Audiobooks are “derivative works” within the definition of copyright law,
7
 and 
they present a number of opportunities for studying claims about the exploitation 
and commercialization of works. Our data compare the markets for audiobook 
recordings of popular novels on either side of the public domain divide: the 
decade of public domain works from 1913-1922 and the decade of copyrighted 
works from 1923-1932. In Part III we apply our findings to the debate about 
copyright term extension. Although our research is in no way conclusive on the 
issue, it strongly suggests that all three arguments in favor of copyright term 
extension are mistaken. 
 
I. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE 
 The primary salience of the data we analyze in Part II relates to the 
ongoing and vociferous debate over the retroactive extension of copyright 
protection to existing creative works. The arguments in favor of extension were 
                                                          
7
 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or 
more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a 
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work’.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
Buccafusco & Heald, Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension 
6 
 
first raised fifteen years ago when powerful players in the copyright industries 
(primarily film, music, and book publishing) engaged in extensive lobbying to 
encourage Congress to pass legislation to prevent their works from falling into the 
public domain.  Following the success of those efforts in the U.S., the copyright 
industries have pushed for term extensions internationally. We briefly chart the 
history of the lobbying efforts in both the U.S. and abroad. We then present the 
three primary economic justifications offered in favor of copyright term 
extension, all of which assert that bad things happen when works fall into the 
public domain. The data we present in Part II tend to refute the attempts made by 
prominent economists and the copyright industries to justify extending the term of 
protection to existing works. 
 
A.  The United States: Sonny Bono, CTEA, and Looking Ahead to 2018 
 The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
8
 
In 1790, a year after the Constitution was ratified, Congress passed the first 
copyright statute providing protection for maps, charts, and books.
9
 This first act 
provided authors with a fourteen-year term of protection that could be renewed 
for additional fourteen years.
10
 Since the eighteenth century, however, Congress 
has extended the copyright term for existing works several times. In 1831, 
Congress extended the initial term of protection to twenty-eight years with a 
fourteen-year renewal term,
11
 and the 1909 Copyright Act extended the renewal 
term to twenty-eight years as well.
12
  
                                                          
8
 U.S. CONST., Art I, § 8, cl. 8.  
9
 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
10
 Id.  
11
 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
12
 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
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The last major revision of the copyright statute, the 1976 Act, further 
lengthened the period of copyright protection.
13
 For existing works that had not 
yet entered the public domain, the Act added an additional forty-seven years of 
protection to the twenty-eight-year term resulting in a total of seventy-five years 
of protection. The Act, which went into effect in 1978, did not reach back and 
revive copyright protection for works that had already entered the public domain, 
so all works published prior to 1923 remain in the public domain. The oldest 
works still subject to copyright were those published in 1923, and their copyrights 
were set to expire at the end of 1998. The possibility of valuable works falling 
into the public domain seemed disastrous to the companies that owned the rights 
to these works, and their owners turned to Congress for another extension.  
By the time Americans had begun to debate the merits of another 
copyright term extension, Congress had already passed legislation doing so.  The 
1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) added an additional 
twenty years of protection to the copyright term for all existing works.
14
 Works 
created between 1923 and 1978 would now receive ninety-five years of 
protection, while works created since 1978 would be protected for the duration of 
the lives of their authors plus seventy years, with anonymous works, 




The intense lobbying efforts of Disney
16
 and other copyright owners
17
 that 
resulted in the passage by voice vote of the the CTEA are well documented.
18
  
                                                          
13
 See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541. 
14
 112 Stat. 2827. 
15
 17 U.S.C §§ 302-04. 
16
 See Bill McAllister, “Mouse Droppings,” WASHINGTON POST (October 15, 1998) (“Hill staff 
members said that other Disney representatives, along with other movie industry representatives, 
had made strong pleas for a 20-year extension to all copyrights.”). 
17
 John L. Fialka, “Songwriters’ Heirs Mourn Copyright Loss,” WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 30, 
1997). 
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Disney Chairman Michael Eisner lobbied Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott 
directly,
19
 and the bill sailed through both houses, with 18 of 25 sponsors 
receiving Disney money, including Lott on the very day he signed up as a co-
sponsor.
20
  According to Professor Dennis Karjala, “The hearings [on term 
extension] were combined with some other bills, so they were not publicized 
under the bill numbers for those trying to follow the legislation. The proponents 
of extension—surprise, surprise!—knew about the House hearings and of course 
testified in favor. The opponents did not even know the hearings took place until 
several months later!”
21
  With significant royalty streams at stake,
22
 copyright 
owners and the sponsors of their bill were taking no chances on a full-blown 
debate over the wisdom of extending the term of protection for valuable works 
that were about to fall into the public domain. 
 The failure of Congress to seriously consider arguments made by 
opponents of term extension suggests that any rationale offered in the legislative 
                                                                                                                                                              
18
 See Keith Pocaro, Private Ordering and Orphan Works:  Our Least Worst Hope?, 2010 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 15, 15 (2010)  (“The current state of copyright law, with wildly longer term 
limits and automatic protection, is a result of continuous content-industry lobbying to protect their 
valuable, aging intellectual property.”); 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/ (web site of law professor 
Dennis Karjala collected documents related to term extension efforts); Alan K. Ota, “Disney in 
Washington: The Mouse That Roared,” CQ Weekly, (Aug. 8, 1998). 
19
 See “Disney Lobbying for Term Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort,” Chicago Tribune (Oct. 
17, 1998). 
20
 Id.  See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2 (noting that the Center for Responsive Politics 
showed that in 1996 media interests donated $1.5 million to six of the sponsors of the Copyright 
Term Extension Act); John Solomon, “Rhapsody in Green,” Boston Globe (Jan. 3, 1999)  
(“Behind the scenes, however, [Disney] has been active. Congressional Quarterly reported that 
Disney chairman Michael Eisner personally lobbied Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, a 
Republican from Mississippi. That day, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, Disney 
gave Lott a $1,000 contribution, following up two weeks later with a $20,000 donation to the 
National Republican Senatorial Committee.”). 
21
 See supra note 2 at 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/what.html. 
22
 See Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 
292 (2002).  (“Disney in particular stood to lose control of billions of dollars’ worth of copyrights-
-Mickey Mouse and Winnie-the-Pooh alone were valued at nearly $8 billion dollars each--if the 
CTEA was not passed.”). 
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history of CTEA was merely make-weight. Nonetheless, the House Report stated 
that retroactive extension “would provide copyright owners generally with the 
incentive to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public.”
23
 In 
the brief debate over the legislation, Senator Howard Coble picked up on this 
rationale and stated that, “When works are protected by copyright, they attract 
investors who can exploit the work for profit."
24
  Bruce Lehman, former 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, put the case most strongly in his 
statement before Congress, “[T]here is ample evidence that shows that once a 
work falls into the public domain it is neither cheaper nor more widely available 
than most works protected by copyright. One reason quality copies of public 
domain works are not widely available may be because publishers will not publish 
a work that is in the public domain for fear that they will not be able to recoup 
their investment or earn enough profit.”
25
 
Whether worries over the lack of availability of older works actually 
motivated Congress or not, the Supreme Court picked up on the argument in the 
failed constitutional challenge to the CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
26
 The Court 
found that Congress “rationally credited projections that longer terms would 
encourage copyright holders to invest in . . . public distribution of their works.”
27
  
The Eldred litigation forced copyright owners to articulate neutral, public interest 
rationales to justify retroactively protecting copyrights in existing works.  The 
primary arguments in defense of term extension enlarged upon the brief 
statements in the legislative history—that works would be less available to the 
public if they fell into the public domain. 
                                                          
23
 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998). 
24
 Congressional Record, Volume 144, 1998, Coble, North Carolina, H1458. 
25





 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003). See also Lawrence B. Solum, The Future of 
Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2005). 
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 The lobbying effort for term extension in the late 1990’s began as an 
ordinary—and wildly successful—plea to Congress to maintain the flow of 
various copyright-fueled income streams without serious consideration of issues 
involving the public domain.  The debate that peaked in Eldred five years later 
had evolved into a full frontal assault on the public domain by copyright owners.  
In need of a public interest rationale to defend their monetary objectives, rights 
holders argued that a myriad of bad things would happen if works were allowed to 
fall into the public domain,
28
 and term extension was thereby asserted as 
necessary to protect the public interest.  Because the present term extension 
expires in 2018, in just a few short years Congress will decide whether to 
acquiesce to the next round of lobbying by copyright owners.
29
  In the meantime, 
other jurisdictions are actively considering U.S-style term extension.  With 
significant royalty streams at stake in other jurisdictions, the pro-extension 
lobbying effort has gone global, with mixed success. 
 
B.  International Lobbying Efforts 
 U.S. copyright owners, whose interests are well represented by U.S. trade 
negotiators, have poured considerable effort and money into securing term 
extensions in other countries as well. They have already been successful in 





 is currently under similarly intense pressure, as is Jamaica
32
 
                                                          
28
 See, e.g., Scott Martin, The Mythology of The Public Domain: Exploring The Myths Behind 
Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (2002). 
29
 Joseph Liu has already looked ahead to 2018 in his latest article.  See Joseph Liu, The New 
Public Domain, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926381. 
30
 Mathew Rimmer, Robbery Under Arms:  Copyright Law and the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, 11 FIRST MONDAY (2006), available at 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs /index.php/fm/article/view /1316 (“In the trade 
negotiations, [the U.S. Trade Representative] demanded that Australia ratify the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty. He 
supported an extension of the copyright term, so that Australia adopted the standards set by the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act”).  See also Maree Sainsbury, Governance and the 
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and other developing countries.
33
 The EU recently acceded to retroactive 
extension for sound recordings,
34
 as has Argentina.
35
 A leaked first draft of the 
proposed Transpacific Partnership between New Zealand, Japan, and Canada 
would require retroactive extension for all copyrighted works.
36
  But other 
jurisdictions they have not been so easy to convince.  Although pressure is 
constant from the copyright lobby, both the UK and Japan have refused to extend 
the term of protection for existing works other than sound recordings. One major 
political party in Brazil has even proposed a reduction in the copyright term.
37
 
The UK in particular seems sensitive to the need for empirical data to 
support any proposed changes.  In fact, the recent government report by Ian 
Hargreaves urges that the "the IP System [be] driven as far as possible by 
objective evidence. Policy should balance measurable economic objectives 
against social goals and potential benefits for rights holders against impacts on 
consumers and other interests. These concerns will be of particular importance in 
                                                                                                                                                              
Process of Law Reform: The Copyright Term Extension in Australia, CANBERRA L. REV. (2007) 
(detailing lobbying effort in Australia to ratify the FTA). 
31
 See Mike Masnick, Copyright Extension Moves to Japan, available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles /20091119/1840217016.shtml.  See also  CPB Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis,Copyright Protection, Not More But Different, WORKING PAPER 
#122 (2000), available at www.cpb.nl/sites/.../copyright-protection-not-more-different.pdf 
(describing “industry call for additional copyright legislation and enforcement” in Netherlands).  
32
 See Mike Masnick, Jamaica Latest to Embrace Retroactive Term Extension and Screw the 
Public Domain, available at http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111014/00471816347/jamaica-
latest-to-embrace-retroactive-copyright-term-extension-screw-public-domain.shtml. 
33
 See ANDREW LENS & LAWRENCE LESSIG, FOREVER MINUS A DAY:  A CONSIDERATION OF 
COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2006); Mexico—Copyright Law Amended, 
available at http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2004/0304Bulletin/Mexico_CopyrightLaw.html. 
34
See Martin Kretschmer, Creativity Stifled? A Joined Academic Statement on the Proposed 
Copyright Term Extension for Sound Recordings European Intellectual Property Review, 9 EUR. 
INTEL. PROP. REV. 314 (2008) (statement of 61 law professors opposing extension). 
35
 Mike Masnick, Here We Go Again:  Argentina Extends Copyright, available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 20091221 /1756577455.shtml. 
36
 See Michael Geist, TPP Copyright Extension Would Keep Some of Canada's Top Authors Out of 
Public Domain For Decades, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6226/125/. 
37
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assessing future claims to extend rights or in determining desirable limits to 
rights."
38
 Consistent with the Hargreaves approach, the earlier commissioned 
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property examined existing empirical evidence and 
rejected arguments that retroactive term extension was necessary.
39
  Although the 
UK had no choice but to accede to the new EU directive retroactively extending 
protection to sound recordings,
40




The debate over the economic wisdom of term extension around the world 
turns on the validity of the same factual assumptions asserted to justify term 
extension in the United States.
42
 Before explaining how our data bear on the 
validity of those assumptions, we provide a fuller account of the pro-extension 
arguments below. 
 
C.  Economic Justifications of Term Extension: Testable Hypotheses 
                                                          
38
 See DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf. 
39
 See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 56-57 (2006), 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf (study commissioned by 
the British Treasury department rejecting ex post justifications for extending copyright protection 
for existing works). 
40
 See Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 
amending Directive 2006/116/EC, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:265:0001:0005:EN:PDF. 
41
 See Eric Bangeman, U.K. Government Resists Music Industry Pressure, Caps Copyrights at 50 
Years, ARS TECHNICA  (July 24, 2007), available at http:// arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2007/07/uk-government-resists-music-industry-pressure-caps-copyrights-at-50-
years.ars; Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment on the Legal and Economic 
Situation of Performers and Record Producers in the European Union, COM (2008) xxx final 
(Apr. 23, 2008), available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/term/ia_term_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) 
(analyzing EU proposal to extend copyright term in sound recordings from 50 to 95 years); Guido 
Westkamp, Transient Copying and Public Communications: The Creeping Evolution of Use and 
Access Rights in European Copyright Law, 36 G.W. INT’L . REV. 1058 (2004). 
42
 See Laura Bradford, A Closer Look at the Public Domain, 13 GREENBAG 343, 346 (2010) 
(“Currently a debate exists globally about the scope of protections for IP . . . Proponents of the 
current strong rules protecting intellectual property argue that a failure to reward innovation 
curtails investment.”); Kretschmer, supra note 20. 
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 Jack Valenti, the President of the Motion Picture Association of America 
once testified derisively to Congress that public domain works were “orphans,”
43
 
meaning that without parents (owners) they would be subject to distressing abuse.  
Sophisticated commentators in support of copyright term extension have offered 
more detailed and theory-driven arguments in support of their position.  These 
arguments, which we discuss here, fall into three categories. All three primary 
arguments rely on factual assertions about what happens when works fall into the 
public domain.  Our study of the market for audio books, discussed in Part II 
below, tests all three assertions. 
 
1. The Under-Exploitation Hypothesis 
 The most prominent justification for term extension asserts that works 
become less available to consumers when they fall in to the public domain.  In 
their influential article arguing for indefinitely renewable copyright for valuable 
works, the law and economics scholars William Landes and Richard Posner 
reasoned that “[A]n absence of protection for intangible works may lead to 
inefficiencies because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and 
exploiting those works.”
44
  Landes and Posner’s argument is a version of the 
classic “public goods” problem in economics. Intellectual property is expensive to 
create, but once it has been created, it can be cheaply copied and used by others. 
Because creators of IP cannot easily exclude others from using it, theory implies 
that they will not be able to recoup their investment costs and will never engage in 
                                                          
43
 Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on Copyright Term 
Extension, H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 53 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion 
Picture Association of America), available at http:// judiciary.house.gov/legacy/447.htm. 
44
 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
471, 475 (2003).  See also LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007) (arguing 
for indefinitely renewable copyright based on 5-year renewal terms). 
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creating the work in the first place. Thus, the law has to step in to create legal 
boundaries allowing creators the chance to recover their investments.
45
 
 This argument can be applied not just to new works but to already created 
works as well. Some works require costly investments to maintain, produce, and 
distribute them over the years. For example, when audio formats changed, 
someone had to spend money to transfer recordings on old vinyl disks to a digital 
format or the old music would not be accessible to most listeners. In theory, 
because those who would invest resources in the conversion cannot prevent others 
from free riding on their efforts, they will not be able to recoup their investment 
and, thus, never bother to make it in the first place. Without a method for 
recouping the cost of conversion, preservation or reproduction, the under-
exploitation hypothesis maintains, commercializers will have inadequate 
incentives to continue production and distribution of older works. Recall that this 
was the primary worry that Congress expressed when passing CTEA in 1998.   
 Professor Arthur Miller adds a related concern about the under-
exploitation of copyrighted works.  He worries that new works deriving from and 
based on materials in the public domain will be underproduced.  Copyright law 
gives owners the exclusive right to make or license derivative works like 
adaptations, sequels, and translations that are based on the original work.
46
 Miller 
argues that these derivative works will not be made without longer copyright 
terms. He reasons, “[Y]ou have to provide incentives for [producers] to produce 
                                                          
45
 Another commentator explains, “If [works enter] the public domain, they [become] obscure and 
thus no one [will] invest in them due to the problem of free riding. Items which retain enough 
value for future use should be given indefinite copyrights to maintain their value.” Miriam Bitton, 
Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 65, 77 (2011). 
46
 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or 
more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a 
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work’.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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the derivatives, the motion picture, the TV series, the documentary, whatever it 
may be—perhaps even a musical! . . . We must incentivize the dissemination 
industries, the preservation industries, and the derivative work industries.”
47
  
According to Miller’s argument, without the ability to prevent copiers, no one will 
be willing to invest the resources in creating a musical version of A Passage to 
India, because, if it proved successful, others would be able to prepare their own 
musicals of the book. These competing versions would drive down the value of 
the first musical thereby undermining the incentives to create it in the first place. 
A staunch advocate of term extension, Miller believes that works need owners in 
order to be adequately exploited in derivative forms. 
  
2. The Overuse Hypothesis 
The “tragedy of the commons,” whereby common ownership leads to the 
degradation of a shared resource, forms the basis of the second primary 
theoretical justification for preventing works from falling into the public 
domain.
48
  The tragedy of the commons can occur when a group of people 
collectively own some resource, like a pasture. Each person has the incentive to 
maximize his use of the pasture before others can do so. This leads to overuse and 
depletion of the pasture through overgrazing. Similarly, if no one has the 
exclusive right to a creative work, then it might be overused (imagine dozens of 
advertisers all using the same song).
49
 In such situations, the typical economic 
                                                          
47
Arthur Miller (panel comments of), The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension:  How 
Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 651, 693 (2000).  Cf. Lee Ann Fennell, 
Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. L. REV. 907, 919 (2004) (“The tendency towards 
overgrazing could thus reinforce one towards underinvestment, leading to a commons featuring 
too few, and too intensively exploited, intellectual products--at least in the absence of legal rules 
or norms designed to cabin these tendencies.”). 
48
 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
49
 At least one commentator asserts that this was the fate of the classic film It’s a Wonderful Life 
before it was rescued from the public domain. See Scott Martin, The Mythology of the Public 
Domain, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 274-75 (2002) (“By the 1980s, there were multiple versions of [It’s 
a Wonderful Life], all in horrid condition.  The film was ’often sliced and diced by local stations 
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solution is to assign individual ownership of the resource so that a single control 
structure can efficiently manage use.
50
  
Landes and Posner make the tragedy of the commons analogy to copyright 
term extension explicit: “a novel or a movie or a comic book character or a piece 
of music or a painting” could be depleted like “unlimited drilling from a common 
pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool prematurely.”
51
  Similarly, Stan 
Liebowitz and Stephan Margolis conclude that “[f]irms producing copies or 
derivatives of creative works after the copyright expires may be in the position of 
fishermen on an open access lake. They produce at their own private optima, not 
taking into account the effects that they have on other producers. Ownership can 
effectively manage these interactions, and copyright provides that ownership.”
52
  
In other words, without owners to police the frequency with which a work is used, 
it may be worn out and lose its value. 
The overuse hypothesis rests on the assumption that the value of creative 
works, like the value of a pasture, is finite and exhaustible.
53
 Each work has an 
optimal level at which it should be exploited and each use beyond that number 
decreases the work’s value to others. While an individual owner of the copyright 
has the incentive to maintain the value of a work over time by preventing it from 
being overused, once the work falls into the public domain others will rush to 
                                                                                                                                                              
who stuffed it with commercials.’  There was no quality control over home video copies of the 
film--consumers had no way of knowing whether the tape they were purchasing was a poor quality 
bootleg version (which most were).”). 
50
 See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing 
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010). 
51
 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2 at 487. 
52
 Stan Liebowitz & Stephan Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright:  
The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 435, 451 (2005). 
53
 The overuse hypothesis also assumes that people will exploit the resource in such a way that its 
value will be diminished. Considerable social science evidence, including from the field of 
behavioral game theory, demonstrate that this kind of overexploitation does not always take place.  
See, e.g. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
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exploit the work’s value immediately.
54
 According to this theory a creative work 
such as a song has increasing social and economic value up to a certain number of 
uses in a given time period (e.g., in commercials during a year). Once that usage 
level is met, however, its value diminishes. Individual copyright owners are 
incentivized to exploit their works at the socially optimal maximum, but if works 
fall into the public domain, others will overuse the works and diminish their 
value. 
 
3. The Misuse Hypothesis 
The third rationale for extending copyright protection to already existing 
works is based on the fear that creative works will lose their value not through 
overuse but through misuse. A number of commentators have expressed concern 
that inappropriate uses of works will debase them and reduce their value.
55
  
Karjala, a leading opponent of term extension, has coined a phrase to explain 
what is allegedly lacking when a work falls into the public domain:  “proper 
husbandry by the copyright owner.”
56
  The idea behind this hypothesis is that 
creative works can lose their value not just through overuse but through the wrong 
                                                          
54
 Of course, the assumption that creative works have finite and exhaustible value is itself open to 
empirical testing and may, in fact, be false. Psychological studies suggest that repeated exposure 
to things may actually increase their attractiveness. Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects Of Mere 
Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1968). 
55
 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 52, at 449 (“Malicious or offensive derivative uses of 
some creative works might seriously diminish their value without a sufficient offset in the form of 
public benefit.”); Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 925 (2003) (“In addition to 
encouraging authors to create new works, copyrights also encourage authors to efficiently utilize 
constituents of works that already exist. For example, if no one had a property right in the 
character Superman, authors could freely create works in which Superman appeared as a character 
without concern for the effect their works had on the value of actual and potential Superman-based 
works.”); Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 469 (1994) 
(arguing that unauthorized uses “end up diminishing the value of the product, not just to the 
creator, but to the general public as well.”),  cf. Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property 
and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 926 (1999) (“[N]on-owners commonly 
benefit from owner control that is used to keep a cultural object ‘stable.”’). 
56
 Dennis Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. 
L. REV. 17, 35-36 (2006). 
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kinds of uses. While the creation of some kinds of derivative works from an 
original work will be valuable and increase social welfare, other kinds of 
derivative works, according to the theory, will actually decrease the value of the 
original and harm social welfare. 
Of course the most commonly expressed concern here involves the specter 
of unauthorized pornographic use that dots the literature on the subject.
57
 As 
Karjala notes, “Rowling, Disney and other creative authors have at least some 
justification for being outraged when their characters are used in contexts wholly 
different from the original, such as pornography . . ..”
58
  If viewers are exposed to 
a pornographic poster of Harry Potter, for example, they will tend to dislike and 
avoid the original movie. Presumably, though, other uses of the original work 
could harm it through the feedback effects of an audience’s reaction to the low 
quality derivative work as well. As we noted above, poor quality productions of 
plays could undermine people’s sense of the value of the drama and its author. Or 
a poor movie version of a novel might reduce the public’s interest in the book.
59
  
Hence, the asserted need for “proper husbandry” and thus, continued ownership 
of the work. 
* * * 
Several years ago Professors Liebowitz and Margolis provided an 
invitation that the present study accepts:  “There are, of course, many expensive 
derivative works that are based upon creations entirely in the public domain. The 
question is whether they are produced as regularly or as well as they would be if 
they were protected by copyright . . . This is an empirical question to which 
                                                          
57
 See e.g , Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 52, at 449 fn.24 (“The existence of a ‘Madeline 
Does Dallas’ might lead to some awkward questions during bedtime stories.”); Heald, supra note 
6, at 25 (“The entire debate seems to turn on the effect of having unauthorized porn movies 
starring Mickey Mouse or Superman.”). 
58
 Id.  
59
 Jamie Lund, Copyright Genericide, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 131 (2009). 
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economists do not yet have the answer.”
60
  We use the market for audiobooks to 
answer both questions about the quantity and quality of derivative works posed by 
these two prominent economists. 
 
II.  EMPIRICALLY TESTING THE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS: THE CASE OF 
AUDIOBOOKS 
 Audiobooks—audio recordings of fiction and nonfiction books—have 
become increasingly popular.  Originally known as “books on tape,” the sale of 
audiobooks has skyrocketed in recent years as technological changes in storage 
capacity, access, and the ubiquity of smart phones have made listening to 
recorded versions of books incredibly convenient. The market for audiobooks is 
estimated to take in $1 billion per year, and it is growing at over 10% per year.
61
 
This growth has been led by more than 300% growth in sales of downloaded 
audiobooks.
62
 Despite the significance of the audiobook market, however, no 
previous research has studied it with an eye towards IP law.  
 In this Part, we report two empirical studies of the audiobook market that 
test the economic assumptions supporting copyright term extension. Study 1 tests 
the underuse and overuse hypotheses by comparing the availability of audiobook 
recordings of popular fiction works from the decades on either side of the 
copyright-public domain divide. In Study 2 we use a novel experimental 
technique to test the misuse hypothesis. Before describing those studies, we first 
discuss some of the existing research that bears on these questions. 
 
                                                          
60
 Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 52, at 449. 
61
 See Audio Publishers Association, Industry Data, available at http://audiopub.org/resources-
industry-data.asp. 
62
 Id.  The report notes, “The CD format still represents the largest single source of dollars but 
showed slight declines overall in 2010 – 58% of revenue (down from 65%) and 43% of unit sales 
(down from 46%).”  Id.  
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A.  Existing Empirical Studies of Copyright Term Extension and the Public 
Domain 
 What happens when a work falls into the public domain is observable, and 
one of us has previously measured the availability of 166 fiction bestsellers from 
1913-22 that fell out of copyright between 1985 to 1997.
63
  Heald measured the 
percentage of best sellers in print and the average number of publishers per work 
in a given year and found that until 2001, public domain books were as available 
as their copyright counterparts.
64
  After 2001, the percentage of in-print public 
domain bestsellers was significantly higher as was the number of publishers per 
work.  By 2006, 98% of the bestsellers from 1913-22 were in print compared to 
only 72% of the copyrighted bestsellers from 1923-32.
65
 These data indicate that 
the fears about both underuse and overuse may be inflated, since public domain 
works are available at roughly similar levels as copyrighted works. 
A second study, this one tracking the use of public domain songs in 
movies, showed that public domain songs were exploited at a rate equal to that of 
their copyrighted counterparts.
66
  Heald measured the rate at which songs from 
1908-32 appeared in movies and accounted for the number of moviegoers who 
attended each movie the year of its release.  He found no difference in the rates at 
which moviegoers were exposed to public domain and copyrighted songs.
67
  Also, 
the study took on the overuse claim directly and found that copyright owners were 
willing to license their songs for use in movies at a rate higher than public domain 
songs were used.
68
  In other words, ownership did not function as a relative 
constraint on comparative use rates in that market. 
                                                          
63
 See Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 6, at 1046-50. 
64




 See Heald, Musical Compositions, supra note 6, at 1 (songs are just as likely to be used in films 




 Id., at 14-15. 
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Finally, at the request of the Library of Congress, Tim Brooks studied the 
rate at which copyright owners were making old vinyl audio recordings of popular 
music available to the public.  He found that non-owners had converted more 




B.  Study 1:  The Exploitation of Popular Fiction in Audiobooks 
 While the research discussed above has cast doubt on the hypotheses 
offered by some economists and proponents of term extension, the present 
audiobook studies enable us to more directly ascertain what happens to works 
when they fall into the public domain.  Studying the audiobook market offers a 
number of distinct advantages. Audiobooks count as derivative works under U.S. 
copyright law, because they are transformations of other copyrighted works.
70
 All 
of the arguments about term extension are based significantly on the presumed ill 
effects of the public domain on the production of derivative works, so, unlike the 
earlier research discussed above, this study can help explore the public domain’s 
effect on different versions of the same work.  
 Moreover, the market for audiobooks is distinctive in its heterogeneity. 
Many audiobooks, of both public domain and copyrighted works, are produced at 
significant expense by firms that use professional actors working on sound stages.  
The production and distribution of these audiobooks may cost thousands of 
                                                          
69
 See TIM BROOKS, NAT'L RECORDING PRES. BD., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SURVEY OF REISSUES OF 
U.S. RECORDINGS 7 & tbl.4, 8 (2005) (copyright owners have made only an average of 14% of 
popular recordings from 1890-1964 available on CD, while non-owners have made 22% of them 
available to the public on CD). 
70
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more pre-existing 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a ‘derivative work’.”). 
 





 With improvements in computing, however, private individuals may 
also make their own audiobooks with nothing more than a copy of the book, a 
computer, and some free software. For example, the website Librivox.org 
collects, organizes, and distributes thousands of privately recorded audiobooks 
produced by lay readers.
72
 Members of the public are encouraged to submit their 
own recordings of public domain works which are then reviewed by the Librivox 
staff to ensure accuracy and comprehensibility.  No effort, however, is made by 
Librivox to judge the quality of recordings or to limit its listings to those of high 
quality.
73
  Accordingly, while many of the audiobooks available on its website 
rival professional recordings in quality, many others are quite poorly made. In 
Study 2 we take advantage of this heterogeneity in audiobook quality to test the 
hypothesis that misuse affects the value of the underlying work.     
 
 1.  Methods:  Study 1 
 The underuse hypothesis and the overuse hypothesis make empirically 
testable assertions about the availability of works once they enter the public 
domain. These hypotheses assert that the work will be either under-exploited or 
diluted, respectively, after it loses copyright protection. Many works that are 
subject to copyright, however, have no significant remaining value when they fall 
into the public domain..  Accordingly, the hypotheses are only relevant to those 
                                                          
71
 Fees for celebrity readers are often paid $4000 to $6000 for standard six-hour recordings. See 





 See  
https://forum.librivox.org/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=219&sid=ce01d19d7a0c0bf3fc0d2fb30171548c 
(“Our feeling is this: in order for LibriVox to be successful we must welcome anyone who wishes 
to honour a work of literature by lending their voice to it. Some readers are better than others, and 
the quality of reading will change from book to book and sometimes from chapter to chapter. But 
we will not judge your reading, though we may give you some advice if you ask for it. This is not 
Hollywood, and LibriVox has nothing to do with commercial media's values, production or 
otherwise. However: we think almost all of our readings are excellent, and we DO try to catch 
technical problems (like repeated text etc.) with our Listeners Wanted/prooflistening stage.”). 
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works that have retained significant value at the time when they would enter the 
public domain. Our study focuses on just these works. 
 Following the methodology used in one of the studies discussed above,
74
 
we have derived a list of bestselling novels that were published in the decade 
before (1913-22) and the decade after (1923-32) the copyright-public domain 
divide. All of the novels published between 1913 and 1922 have entered the 
public domain, while all of those published in or after 1923 are still subject to 
copyright protection.
75
 The list includes 171 public domain novels and 174 
copyrighted novels.
76
 Our goal was to collect a large enough sample of fiction 
from the same period that would support statistically meaningful analyses.  
 Of course, many books that were bestsellers when published may no 
longer have significant value. Accordingly, we derived a second, smaller list of 
novels that have shown enduring popularity. This list, chosen on the basis of 
number of editions in print and consultation with experts in the literature of the 
period, includes twenty public domain novels and twenty copyrighted novels.
77
 
These books, like James Joyce’s The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) 
and William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (1929), are still widely read and 
retain significant cultural and economic value. Throughout the Article, we refer to 
these novels as “durable.”  
 To test the underuse and overuse hypotheses we collected data on the 
availability and prices of audiobook versions of all 375 works. We searched the 
most widely used online retailers of audiobooks, Audible.com (owned and 
operated by Amazon.com)
78
 and Barnes and Noble,
79
 who sell versions in either 
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 Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 6. 
75
 We discarded a handful of post-1922 bestsellers that had not been renewed after the expiration 
of their initial 28 year copyright term.  Such works fell into the public domain and were not 
eligible for the 1976 or 1998 term extensions. 
76
 The list of titles is available in Appendix A. 
77
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CD or downloadable mp3 format. We also double-checked our results against the 
online listing published by Bowker’s Books in Print.
80
 The availability of free 
recordings of public domain novels from Librivox was also collected.  Finally, in 
addition to noting the availability of titles, we computed the average prices of 
professional recordings across the different retailers.  
 
 2.  Results: Study 1 
 When we compare the full samples of 171 public domain novels and 174 
copyrighted novels, we see some similarities and some differences. Of the public 
domain novels, 58 of the 171 titles (33%) have at least one available recording. Of 
those, 17 only exist in a Librivox recording.  There are a total of 193 total 
recordings of the recorded works (67 on CD and 126 on mp3), for an average of 
3.3 recordings per recorded title. For the 174 copyrighted titles in the full sample, 
27 are available in audiobook format (16%). Of these, there are a total of 80 total 
recordings (44 on CD and 36 on mp3), for an average of 3.0 recordings per 
recorded title. Interestingly, the average price for the available recordings is fairly 
similar for public domain and copyrighted titles (Public Domain: CD = $26, mp3 
= $22; Copyrighted: CD = $28, mp3 = $19). 
 
 TABLE 1.  FULL SAMPLE OF NOVELS 

















Public Domain 171 58 33 193 3.3 $26 $22 
Copyrighted 174 27 16 80 3.0 $28 $19 
 




 See www.booksinprint.com  
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 Our data suggest that for bestselling novels from 1913-1932, being in the 
public domain roughly doubles the likelihood that the work will be available in 
audiobook format. Despite this increase, however, the fact that a work is in the 
public domain and is thus free to be used without licensing does not ensure that it 
will be made into an audiobook. Even when we include the versions available on 
Librivox, fewer than half of the public domain titles are available in audiobooks. 
Moreover, the similarity in prices between professionally read public domain and 
copyrighted audiobooks at least implies the public domain titles are not being 
produced in appreciably lower quality versions. 
 When we turn to the list of titles of enduring popularity, the story is 
similar. All of the twenty public domain titles are currently available in an 
audiobook version, and there are 6.25 recordings per title. Of the enduringly 
popular copyrighted works, however, only 16 are currently available in audiobook 
format (80%), and there are only 3.25 versions per recorded title. The data on 
pricing are consistent with Heald’s earlier study finding that the 20 copyrighted 
durable books were significantly more expensive on a price-per-page basis than 
the 20 public domain durable books.  When we calculated the price per minute of 
the durable copyrighted audio books, we found the CD’s to cost $.05 per minute 
and MP3 downloads to cost $.036 per minute.  The corresponding price for the 
durable public domain audio books was significantly lower:  $.038 per minute for 
CD’s and $.028 for MP3 downloads. 
  
 TABLE 2. ENDURINGLY POPULAR NOVELS 



















20 20 100 134 6.25 $0.038 $0.028 
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Copyrighted 20 16 80 62 3.25 $0.050 $0.036 
 
 As with the full sample, being in the public domain increases the 
likelihood that a work of enduring popularity will be available in audiobook 
format, and it increases the number of recordings of the title that are likely to be 
available when compared to similar copyrighted works.  For these works, we do 
see full exploitation of public domain novels in audiobook format.  We leave to 
Part III our analysis of whether the number of recordings per title constitutes 
overexploitation. 
 
C.  Study 2: Audiobook Quality and Tarnishment 
 In Study 2 we address the tarnishment hypothesis put forward by 
economists and proponents of copyright term extension. According to this 
hypothesis, once works enter the public domain and are free to be used by anyone, 
they will be subjected to a variety of inappropriate and poor quality uses that will 
undermine the works’ cultural and economic value. Without copyright ownership, 
so the argument goes, valuable works will not be properly husbanded. This study 
focuses only on the durable works described in Study 1. Using a novel 
experimental methodology, we are able to test 1) whether public domain works 
are produced in poorer quality audiobook versions than copyrighted works and 2) 
whether poorer quality audiobook versions affect the perceived value of the 
novels from which they are made. 
 
 1.  Methods: Study 2 
 To test these questions we relied on the heterogeneity of available 
audiobook recordings from multiple sources. As we mentioned above, audiobooks 
are available from both professional and amateur sources. If the tarnishment 
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hypothesis is correct, we would expect that:  1) the quality of audiobook 
recordings of copyrighted works would be higher than that of audiobooks based 
on public domain works (because the copyrighted works have an owner to 
husband them); and 2) the lower quality of the public domain audiobooks would 
be reflected in a lower perceived value of the underlying novel.  
 To test these assumptions, we recruited subjects through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk to listen to selections of audiobook recordings and to provide 
feedback on them. After agreeing to participate, the subjects were directed to the 
survey instrument that was hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform.
81
 The 
subjects were told that the survey was being conducted by researchers who were 
testing the quality of different people as potential audiobook readers. The subjects 
were then presented with five alternating five-minute recordings taken from the 
beginning of the fifth chapter of the selected novels.
82
 After listening to each 
selection, the subjects were asked a series of questions: 
1) First, they were asked two comprehension questions to ensure that 
they were paying attention.  
 
2) Next, they were asked to rate the quality of the reader’s readiness for 








 We selected the fifth chapter to avoid biases associated with particularly well-known or 
interesting first chapters. 
83
 The points on the scale were labeled: 
1) This reader could never produce a commercially acceptable audiobook. 
2) With great improvement this reader could produce an acceptable audiobook. 
3) This reader is close to good enough, but still needs some improvement. 
4) The reader was acceptable for commercial distribution. 
5) The reader was very good, clearly ready for commercial distribution. 
6) The reader was excellent. 
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3) Subjects were then asked if they had read or seen other versions of the 
work and, if so, how much they liked them. 
 
4) Finally, subjects were told that the surveyors would have multiple 
paperback copies of the book left over after completing the survey. 
The subjects were asked to indicate how much they thought the 
surveyors should sell the extra copies for, and they were instructed that 
paperback copies typically sell for $8 to $12. 
 
After listening to the five different recordings, the subjects were asked a series of 
questions about their own audiobook usage and some demographic questions. 
 The recordings were chosen from works on our list of the most enduringly 
popular novels on either side of the copyright-public domain divide, and they 
came from several different sources. Since there were only sixteen professional 
recordings of the twenty most durable copyrighted works, we selected all sixteen 
of them. In addition, we randomly selected sixteen of the twenty professionally 
recorded public domain audiobooks. Comparing the subjects’ responses to these 
sets of recordings enabled us to test whether the professional versions of the 
public domain works were being produced at the same standards as professional 
versions of the copyrighted works.  
 In addition, we were interested in studying versions of the works that were 
produced by non-professionals. Accordingly, we selected recordings of the same 
sixteen public domain works that are downloadable on the website Librivox. 
These recordings had been made by private parties using their own equipment. Of 
course, because the copyrighted works are still under copyright, non-professional 
recordings of these works are not available publicly. To complete the sample and 
to provide a control for the comparative attractiveness of the content of all the 
underlying works, we employed a non-professional reader to record copies of the 
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sixteen copyrighted works. We wanted to make sure that any particularly exciting 
or interesting prose did not bias the evaluation of the reader. 
This strategy gave us a 2 x 2 matrix of recordings (Legal Status: 
Copyrighted vs. Public Domain; Source:  Professional vs. Non-Professional). 
 
 2.  Results: Study 2 
 Our data provide almost no support for the arguments made by proponents 
of copyright term extension that once works fall into the public domain they will 
be produced in poor quality versions that will undermine their cultural or 
economic value.
84
 Our data indicate no statistically significant difference, for 
example, between the listeners’ judgments of the quality of professional 
audiobook readers of copyrighted and public domain texts.
85
 We also fail to find a 
significant difference between the price that subjects indicate the paperback 
copies should be sold for.
86
 This suggests, as we will discuss in more detail 
below, that the producers of professional audiobook recordings of public domain 
works are not using poorer quality readers than are the producers of copyrighted 
works. 
 Our data do reveal, however, that the amateur recordings of both 
copyrighted and public domain works are perceived to be of lower quality than 
are the professional versions. See Table 3. Librivox recordings of public domain 
works were perceived to be significantly worse than professional recordings (3.54 
vs. 4.30, on a scale of 1-6, respectively),
87
 and the recordings that our assistant 
                                                          
84
 The full statistical analysis of our data will be provided in an appendix. In addition to the data 
reported here, we reran the study with a sample of subjects recruited from the general population 
by Qualtrics. The results of that study are identical to those reported here, and we chose to report 
the mTurk data because the quality of the responses that we received were higher in the mTurk 
sample. 
85
 Two sample t test, p = 0.4452. To indicate a statistically significant difference, the “p value” 
should be less than 0.05.   
86
 Two sample t test, p = 0.9203. 
87
 Two sample t test, p = 0.0002. 
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made were perceived to be significantly worse than professional recordings of 
both copyrighted and public domain works.
88
 This difference is not surprising—
the resources that go into professional recordings will tend to be much greater 
than those that go into amateur recordings.  
The important question, however, is whether the perceived difference in 
quality between amateur and professional recordings resulted in different 
judgments of the value of the underlying work. Basically, the answer is no, but 
the data are not entirely unambiguous. In general, we found a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the perceived quality of a recording 
and the amount that subjects thought copies should be sold for. This is important 
for two reasons. First, it suggests that our metric for studying the underlying value 
of a work (i.e., asking how much we should sell copies for) is sensitive to changes 
in quality of the recording and, thus, indicates validity. Second, it suggests that 
people who listen to poor quality recordings of audiobooks are likely to attribute 
some of their dissatisfaction to the underlying work. Thus, there appears to be 
some feedback effect between the quality of a given version of a work and the 
value of the underlying work. 
 
TABLE 3. QUALITY AND PRICE OF RECORDINGS 




Copyright Professional 4.17 $8.26 
Public Domain Librivox 3.54 $8.00 
Copyright Research 3.56 $8.40 
                                                          
88
 Assistant vs. Copyrighted: two sample t test, p = 0.0027; Assistant vs. Public Domain: two 
sample t test, p = 0.0001. We detected no significant difference between our assistant’s recordings 
of public domain works and his recordings of copyrighted works. 
 








Importantly, though, the correlation between recording quality and price 
did not manifest itself in the manner predicted by proponents of copyright term 
extension. Our data indicated no statistically significant differences in book price 
between any of the paired conditions.
89
 Thus, for example, although the Librivox 
recordings of public domain works were judged to be of lower quality than 
professional recordings of public domain works, we detected no significant 
difference between the price subjects indicated for the paperback books.
90
 
Moreover, although we detected a positive correlation between quality and price 
for the entire sample of works, we found no such correlation within any of the 
subsamples. These results suggest that although there may be a modest feedback 
effect associated with poor quality versions of creative works, that effect is not 
related to whether a work is protected by copyright or not.  
 
D.  Limitations of Our Data 
 Before discussing the implications of our findings for the copyright term 
extension debate, we wish to pause to reflect on the limits of our data. In the 
analysis that follows, we do not and cannot claim to have established all the 
precise effects of works falling into the public domain. There may be effects that 
we did not measure or that apply to industries other than those we have explored.  
 Perhaps the biggest limitation of our data involves the difficulty of 
scientifically proving the lack of a difference. Social scientific research and 
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 In addition, we found no meaningful effects based on prior exposure to the works, although this 
likely was the result of the small sample of subjects who had prior experience with the works. 
90
 Two sample t test, p = 0.3203. 
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statistical methods are normally aimed at demonstrating the existence of a 
difference between a treatment group and a control group. When such a difference 
is shown, there is reason to believe that it is the result of true differences between 
the groups. When no difference is detected, however, the inverse inference is not 
necessarily true. The failure to find an effect may be the result of a poor 
experimental design that is not sensitive to differences that actually exist or of 
insufficient statistical power.  
 While it is possible that some such problem accounts for our failure to 
detect a difference between the quality of copyrighted or public domain 
professional readings, we are reasonably confident that our findings track reality. 
First, our study included hundreds of subjects sourced via multiple methods, and 
it should have provided the statistical power necessary to detect a difference. 
Recall, that we did detect a significant difference between the quality of Librivox 
recordings and the quality of professional recordings and a positive correlation 
between the quality of a recording and the valuation of the underlying work, 
although that correlation did not map on to differences between the source of the 
reading (professional vs. Librivox).  
 We certainly hope that future research will continue to study the effects of 
the public domain on the value of works. Perhaps other methods can be devised 
that overcome some of these limitations. In the meantime, however, our data 
suggest that anxieties about the public domain are substantially overblown. 
 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR IP LAW AND POLICY: THE NEXT TIME DISNEY COMES 
KNOCKING 
 Our audiobook study has obvious implications for the ongoing worldwide 
debate over the extension of copyright terms in existing works.  That debate has 
centered on factual assumptions about what happens to works when they fall into 
the public domain, assumptions that are contradicted by our data.  In addition, our 
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data on the pricing of audio books, in conjunction with similar data on book 
pricing,
91
 illustrate one important reason why the copyright term extension debate 
should matter to consumers:   We found higher prices for recordings of the most 
popular older works. 
 
A.  Addressing the Under-Exploitation Hypothesis 
 Lack of availability has been the most prominent concern expressed by 
Congress and commentators about works falling into the public domain.  If works 
tended to disappear when their copyright terms expired, a plausible argument 
could be made for term extension because these lost works would be unavailable 
for future readers, users, and creators.  Consistent with several previous studies,
92
 
however, we found that audio books were significantly more likely to be made 
from older bestselling public domain works than from bestselling copyrighted 
works from the same era.  Even excluding audiobooks available for free at 
www.librivox.org, the public domain works were more available to consumers in 
audio book form.  For the full sample, public domain works were twice as likely 
to be available, and for the sample of enduringly popular works, public domain 
titles were 20% more likely to be available. These data suggest that copyright 
status, in fact, seems to reduce availability, even for the most popular books.  
Even today, there are no unabridged audio recordings for three of the most 
popular novels of the 1930’s, Magnificent Obsession by Lloyd Douglas,  Mutiny 
on the Bounty by Nordoff and Hall, and Death Comes for the Archbishop by 
Willa Cather, and D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1930) did not 
appear as an unabridged audio book until 2011. 
 The finding of a greater availability of audio books made from public 
domain works represents a significant advance over an early study finding that 
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 See Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 6, at 1048-49. 
92
 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. 
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bestselling public domain novels are more likely to be in print and in more 
editions than the bestselling copyrighted novels from the same era.
93
  Unlike 
reprinted novels, audio books are derivative works that require time and effort to 
produce.  Professional versions of audiobooks can cost substantial sums to record, 
produce, and market.  Economists have asserted that producers would hesitate to 
expend significant new resources in the creation of derivative works when 
competitors could freely produce their own versions of the work.
94
  Producers of 
audiobooks are clearly not deterred by their inability to exclude competitors from 
making competing products.  As our data suggest, the market for public domain 
audiobooks thrives even though multiple competing versions are often available 
of the same work.  A right to exclude is clearly not needed to incentivize the 
production of audio books made from older works. 
 If the argument for copyright term extension turns on the need for 
incentives to reproduce older works or create derivative works from them, then 
existing empirical evidence suggests that term extensions are not needed and are 
probably counter-productive. 
 
B.  Addressing the Over-Exploitation Hypothesis 
 As discussed in Part I, economists not only worry about the underuse of 
public domain works, they also are concerned that some works will be over-
exploited if no single owner has the right to exclude others.  This tragedy of the 
commons argument suggests that because no individual has the right to exclude 
others, everyone has the incentive to rush to exploit the resource while it has 
value.  According to the argument, the public will allegedly encounter public 
                                                          
93
 See Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 6. 
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domain works so frequently that their value will be lost.
95
  Our data suggest that 
this alternative ground for copyright term extension is also contradicted by the 
empirical evidence. 
 For our whole data set, we found an average of 3.3 recordings made for 
each recorded public domain work and 3.0 recordings for each recorded 
copyrighted book, an insignificant difference that provides little evidence that 
public domain books are being over-exploited and worn out due to their 
unprotected legal status.  In addition, the average price of recorded books in the 
full public domain data set and the full copyrighted data set was virtually the 
same, suggesting that the value of the public domain works in comparison to their 
copyrighted counterparts had not been destroyed by overuse.   
We find no evidence of over-exploitation even when we consider only the 
most enduringly popular public domain and copyrighted works.  We observed a 
significant difference in exploitation rates, although the sample size was small.  
Of the twenty works in each group of this sample, the 20 most enduringly popular 
public domain books had an average 6.25 audio book recordings per title, while 
the 16 most popular copyrighted works had only 3.25 audio book recordings per 
title.  While this is evidence of a higher level of exploitation, we would argue that 
it is not evidence of harmful overuse. 
 One clue that the increased availability of public domain works is not a 
signal of over-exploitation comes from the pricing data that we accumulated.
96
  
Although audio books made from the durable public domain works do not 
command as high a price, the price is still fairly high and close to that for 
copyrighted works. Even with the competition that professional public domain 
versions face from free recordings on Librivox, they are still able to command 
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 For a succinct expression of this concern in the publicity rights context, see Bitton, supra note 
45 (“if everyone uses the likeness of Humphrey Bogart in advertising, it will eventually become 
worthless”). 
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 See Table 3 supra. 
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market prices that are reasonably close to those obtained by copyrighted works. 
 While professionally produced public domain audiobooks are priced lower 
than copyrighted versions, there is little reason to believe that this price difference 
is due to over-exploitation and the “wearing out” phenomenon.  Several 
compelling explanations for the price difference that are unrelated to an overuse 
effect also exist.  First, the producers of the audio recordings from copyrighted 
books have to pay a royalty to the copyright owner which may increase the cost of 
producing the work and raise its price in relation to the public domain works 
which require no such payment.  Just as likely, the “intrabrand” competition 
between the multiple editions of the audio books based on the same public 
domain work will drive down their prices even in the absence of any “wearing 
out” phenomenon.  Note, however, that despite this competition and the 
competition from free Librivox recordings, the price for professionally produced 
public domain audiobooks is still fairly high.  Finally, data presented in a prior 
study suggests a significant disparity in the popularity and appeal of the public 
domain and copyrighted titles at issue.
97
  If the copyrighted works are indeed 
more iconic, then we would expect versions of them to be sold at a higher price.  
Overall, the pricing disparity between audiobooks based on public domain and 
                                                          
97
See Heald, supra note 6, at 1046-7 (“[A]s of 1965, when all of the forty durable books were still 
protected by copyright, only five of the twenty books (1913-1922) that have since fallen into the 
public domain had sold 1,000,000 copies.  As of the same date, eleven of the twenty books (1923-
1932) still protected by copyright today had sold 1,000,000 copies, despite having on the average 
ten fewer years to accomplish that feat.  Even more tellingly, the top five books from the public 
domain set (1913-1922) had sold a total of only 7,381,709 volumes as of 1965, while the top five 
sellers from the copyrighted set (1923-1932) had sold 20,289,943 volumes.  And as of 1965, the 
top five books still protected by copyright had fifteen fewer years to sell than those that have since 
fallen into the public domain.  Sales data for books selling fewer than 1,000,000 copies as of 1965 
is not publicly available. An update on books that had sold over 2,000,000 volumes by 1975 
reemphasizes the comparative popularity of the books published from 1923-1932.  Only one of the 
durable books published from 1913-1922 is on the list (Of Human Bondage, with sales of 
2,609,236), while seven from 1923-1932 are on the list. Sales of those seven books, as of 1975, 
totaled 28,732,714.”), citing ALICE PAYNE HACKETT, 70 YEARS OF BEST SELLERS, 1895-1965, at 
111-45 (1967), and ALICE PAYNE HACKETT & JAMES HENRY BURKE, 80 YEARS OF BEST SELLERS, 
1895-1975 (1977). 
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copyrighted works does not convince us that the public has seen its most valuable 
public domain works dangerously over-recorded. 
 In addition, as a practical matter, it is difficult to see how the availability 
of multiple versions of an audiobook would diminish the value of the underlying 
work.  No one is forced to consume an audio book, so multiple copies are not 
flung in the face of the consuming public who then become tired of hearing the 
story.  If audiobooks were played in the background of commercials or 
department stores, perhaps repetitive choice-less consumption might negatively 
affect consumer attitudes, but audiobooks are not used that way.  And even with 
music, which does appear in commercials and in the background ambience of 
shopping areas, we suspect that businesses try not to alienate their customers by 
overusing the same music.  Market discipline should make over-exploitation 
highly unlikely—it’s just bad business.  We find it difficult to imagine how any 
harm flows from the higher exploitation rate that we measure in the set of the 
twenty most enduringly popular public domain works. 
 
C.  Addressing the Tarnishment Hypothesis 
 Although many legal analysts are skeptical of the claim that 
“inappropriate” uses of a work can negatively affect its value,
98
 the present study 
is the first to evaluate empirically the claim that a work will be tarnished by 
unconstrained uses in the absence of a copyright owner to “husband” the work 
and protect it from the ravages of the free market.  One of us has earlier argued 
that even pornographic version of works are unlikely to affect value,
99
 but one 
could imagine, for example, that a truly horrible movie made from a book might 
have an effect on the sales of the book.  If the Howard the Duck comic book had 
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 See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 26 (2005) (“[a]nyone is hard pressed to believe that Shakespeare's star 
has been dimmed by the calamities committed in his name . . . .”). 
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still been regularly in print at the time of the release of its famously awful movie 
version,
100
 perhaps sales would have dropped (although such a fate would also 
serve as an example of how copyright ownership does not prevent debasement).  
By the same token, one could imagine that a listener to an inferior recording of an 
audiobook might become less likely to consume the underlying written work, 
thereby diminishing its value. 
 Given how easily the claim of misuse can be asserted in attacks on the 
public domain made by supporters of copyright term extension, we felt that it was 
critical to take the debasement argument seriously.  The audiobook context 
provided an attractive opportunity for study, because the claim of tarnishment 
caused by a poor audiobook reading seems more credible than the claim that 
Santa Claus has been debased by the 33 pornographic movies with Santa 
appearing in the title.
101
 
 In Part I, we explained that any claim of debasement in the audiobook 
market would be predicated on two underlying factual assumptions.  First, readers 
of public domain audiobooks would have to be inferior to readers of copyrighted 
audiobooks, and second, the inferior versions of the audiobooks would have to 
negatively affect consumers’ valuation of the underlying work.  We found little 
support for either assumption. 
 Regarding the first prong of the hypothesis, professional readers of 
audiobooks made from public domain works were rated just as highly as 
professional readers of copyrighted books.  The companies that produce public 
domain audiobooks appear to be selecting readers who are as talented as those 
selected for copyrighted titles.  According to the results of our study, when 
consumers go to the three main sources for audiobooks (www.audible.com, 
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 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_the_Duck_(film) (“The film frequently ranks among 
the worst films of all time.”). 
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 See www.aifd.com (searching for “Santa” under the title criterion) (last visited May 23, 2012). 
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Amazon, and Barnes & Nobles), they will likely find that the public domain 
books are equally well read as the copyrighted books.  These data substantially 
undermine any claim of debasement in the most important market for audiobooks.  
Market discipline is apparently sufficient to insure that the producer of an 
audiobook for commercial sale will hire a competent reader.  Producers of 
audiobooks would like to establish a positive reputation and make a steady profit 
in the market.
102
  It should be no surprise that such producers take adequate care 
in the selection of readers whether the underlying work chosen for exploitation is 
copyrighted or in the public domain. 
We did find, however, that the amateur readers who distributed audio 
versions of public domain books on www.librivox.org were, not surprisingly, 
rated significantly lower than professional readers of the same books. Non-
professionals using their own equipment produce significantly lower quality 
recordings that do professional readers in recording studios. 
The question for the second prong of the tarnishment hypothesis, then, is 
whether these lower quality recordings resulted in lower valuations of the 
underlying works. Although we did find a positive correlation between the quality 
of readings and the subjects’ valuation of the underlying work, that effect did not 
correlate with the source of the recording.  In other words, quality correlates with 
valuation whether the subject listened to an amateur recording, a professional 
recording of a public domain book or a professional recording of a copyrighted 
book.  However, the absolute values assigned to the underlying works by subjects 
who listened to audiobooks from all three sources were not significantly different.  
So, the tarnishment thesis has some force, but ownership does not prevent 
tarnishment in this particular market.  Of course, this is contrary to what 
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 On the value of attribution and reputation in intellectual property see Christopher Jon 
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(finding that creators significantly value opportunities for attribution). 
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proponents of term extension argue:  that ownership prevents tarnishment in a 
way that free market discipline does not. 
We do not and cannot claim that our data conclusively prove that falling 
into the public domain has no effect on the value of a work. Effects may exist that 
we were unable to measure, or they may exist for industries or products that we 
have not studied. But even if works are theoretically harmed by falling into the 
public domain, proponents of term extension should be expected to establish such 
losses empirically, because term extension comes with considerable costs that 
must be justified. One such cost, already noted, involves pricing.  The exclusive 
rights granted by copyright can sometimes allow owners to charge above-market 
rates for their products. Imposing such costs on consumers is only worthwhile if 
the public is getting something valuable in return.   If proponents feel that 
imposing these costs are justified, then they should support their arguments with 
more than bald assertions. 
Perhaps more important than the cost to consumers, other creators must 
bear higher costs when already created works continue to remain subject to 
copyright protection. Creators may wish to perform these works, or adapt them 
for new uses, or incorporate them into other kinds of works.
103
 When works are 
protected by copyright, however, creators must obtain a license or face stiff legal 
penalties. This creates multiple problems for new creators and, thus, the public. 
Copyright owners may demand more in licensing fees than creators are willing or 
able to pay, resulting in works not getting made.
104
 In other cases, the copyright 
owners may be impossible to locate and contact. For these “orphan works,” the 
opportunity for bargaining over their use is impossible, and again, derivative 
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 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
104
 See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 6 (showing that owners of IP rights often demand 
substantially more money to license their works than others are willing to pay, leading to 
inefficiencies in IP markets). 
 





 If the public is going to be asked to bear costs for an 
additional period of years, it is incumbent upon term extension proponents to 
establish that those costs are worth bearing. 
 
D.  Tarnishment beyond Term Extension 
In addition, we note, that our audiobook quality and valuation data may be 
relevant in multiple contexts outside the copyright term extension debate.  First, 
some copyright fair use disputes seem to turn on the argument that inappropriate 
uses will devalue a copyrighted work.  For example, those who oppose the 
publication of fan fiction (for example, new Harry Potter tales concocted by 
enthusiastic fans on the internet
106
) often allege that the copyrighted characters 
will be tarnished by unconstrained storytelling on the web.
107
  Our data may 
suggest that amateur fan fiction is unlikely to negatively affect the value of the 
underlying character franchise.   
Second, outside of the realm of copyright law, our study might provide 
support for those who applaud the judiciary’s continuing reluctance to vigorously 
implement the Federal Trademark Anti-Dilution Act.
108
  The tarnishment prong of 
dilution doctrine asserts that a trademark loses some of its intrinsic value when 
consumers encounter the mark used in an inappropriate context, such as when the 
mark is placed on goods of inferior quality.  Our data show that listeners to 
Librivox recordings find the readers to be inferior but do not translate that 
sentiment to a significantly lower valuation of the associated work.  Finally, the 
doctrine of post-sale confusion in trademark law rests on the assumption that a 
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 See Randall C. Picker, The Google Books Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works 
Monopoly?, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 383 (2009). 
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trademark owner is harmed when a bystander merely observes a trademark on an 
inferior product (imagine someone who sees a poor quality Chicago Bears sweat 
shirt without knowing that it’s a knock off).  Our data may suggest that the 
assumption of such a harm is unrealistic. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The copyright term extension debate, as it once again begins to heat up, 
will have substantial consequences for the creative industries and the consuming 
public. If copyrighted works begin once again to enter the public domain, their 
owners will stand to lose millions of dollars in revenue. On the other hand, that 
revenue comes directly from consumers’ pockets and the expiration of valuable 
copyrights saves those consumer costs. Perhaps more importantly, those works 
will be available to an army of creative artists who will be able to use them in 
their works in ways that were impossible while the works were copyrighted. 
Whether it will be a good thing if and when this happens is an empirical question 
that is susceptible to quantitative measurement. This Article has addressed that 
question.  
Our data suggest that the three principal arguments in favor of copyright 
term extension—under-exploitation, over-exploitation, and tarnishment—are 
unsupported There seems little reason to fear that once works fall into the public 
domain, their value will be substantially reduced based on the amount or manner 
in which they are used. We do not claim that there are no costs to movement into 
the public domain, but, on the opposite side of the ledger, there are considerable 
benefits to users of open access to public domain works. We suspect that these 
benefits dramatically outweigh the costs. 
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APPENDIX A – FULL SAMPLE OF BESTSELLING NOVELS, 1913-1932 
Public Domain Works (1913-1922) 
John Fox, Heart of the Hills (1913); Robert Herrick, His Great Adventure (1913); 
Jack London, John Barleycorn (1913); Gene Porter, Laddie (1913); Willa Cather, 
O Pioneers (1913); Eleanor Porter, Pollyanna (1913); O. Henry, Rolling Stones 
(1913); D.H. Lawrence, Sons and Lovers (1913); Frances Burnett, T. Tembarom 
(1913); Jeffrey Farnol, The Amateur Gentleman (1913); Winston Churchill, The 
Inside of the Cup (1913); Rex Beach, The Iron Trail (1913); Gilbert Parker, The 
Judgment House (1913); W.B. Maxwell, The Devil’s Garden (1913); Jack 
London, The Valley of the Moon (1913); Hall Caine, The Woman Thou Gavest Me 
(1913); Henry Harrison, V.V.’s Eyes (1913); Ellen Glasgow, Virginia (1913); 
Robert Herrick, Clark’s Field (1914); James Joyce, Dubliners (1914); Leona 
Dalrymple, Diane of the Green Van (1914); Booth Tarkington, Penrod (1914); 
Edgar Burroughs, Tarzan of the Apes (1914); Rex Beach, The Auction Block 
(1914); Harold Wright, The Eyes of the World (1914); William Locke, The 
Fortunate Youth (1914); George Barr McCutcheon, The Prince of Graustark 
(1914); Mary Watts, The Rise of Jennie Cushing (1914); Owen Johnson, The 
Salamander (1914); Frank Norris, Vandover and the Brute (1914); Winston 
Churchill, A Far Country (1915); Henry Harrison, Angela’s Business (1915); 
Jean Webster, Dear Enemy (1915); F. Hopkinson Smith, Felix O’Day (1915); 
William Locke, Jaffery (1915); Mary Roberts Rinehart, K (1915); Gene Stratton 
Porter, Michael O’Halloran (1915); Somerset Maugham, Of Human Bondage 
(1915); Irving Cobb, Old Judge Priest (1915); Eleanor Porter, Pollyanna Grows 
Up (1915); Harry Leon Wilson, Ruggles of Red Gap (1915); Dorothy Canfield, 
The Bent Twig (1915); Theodore Dreiser, The Genius (1915); Stewart White, The 
Gray Dawn (1915); Ernest Poole, The Harbor (1915); Raphael Sabatini, The Sea-
Hawk (1915); Zane Grey, The Lone Star Ranger (1915); Willa Cather, The Song 
of the Lark (1915); Booth Tarkington, The Turmoil (1915); James Joyce, A 
Portrait of the Artist (1916); Ethel Dell, Bars of Iron (1916); Peter Bernard Kyne, 
Cappy Ricks (1916); William McFee, Casuals of the Sea (1916); Eleanor Porter, 
Just David (1916); Ellen Glasgow, Life and Gabriella (1916); H.G. Wells, Mr. 
Britling Sees it Through (1916); Frank Spearman, Nan of Music Mountain (1916); 
Booth Tarkington, Seventeen (1916); Winston Churchill, The Dwelling Place of 
Light (1916); Kathleen Norris, The Heart of Rachael (1916); William Dean 
Howells, The Leatherwood God (1916); Henry Kitchell Webster, The Real 
Adventure (1916); Harold Wright, When a Man’s a Man (1916); Edith Wharton, 
Xingu (1916); Ring Lardner, You Know Me, Al (1916); Alice Cholmondeley, 
Christine (1917); Edna Ferber, Fanny Herself (1917); Ring Lardner, Gullible’s 
Travels (1917); Ernest Poole, His Family (1917); Robert Hichens, In the 
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Wilderness (1917); Christopher Morley, Parnassus on Wheels (1917); David 
Graham Phillips, Susan Lennox:  Her Rise and Fall (1917); James Branch Cabell, 
The Cream of the Jest (1917); Jeffrey Farnol, The Definite Object (1917); Ethel 
Dell, The Hundredth Chance (1917); Ralph Connor, The Major (1917); Irving 
Bacheller, The Light in the Clearing (1917); William Locke, The Red Planet 
(1917); Stephen McKenna, Sonia (1917); Eleanor Porter, The Road to 
Understanding (1917); May Sinclair, The Tree of Heaven (1917); Joseph 
Hergesheimer, The Three Black Pennys (1917); Zane Grey, Wildfire (1917); Gene 
Porter, A Daughter of the Land (1918); Thorne Smith, Biltmore Oswald (1918); 
Zona Gale, Birth (1918); Zane Grey, The Desert of Wheat (1918); Edward 
Streeter, Dere Mable (1918); V. Blasco Ibanez, The Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse (1918); Joseph Hergesheimer, Java Head (1918); Willa Cather, My 
Antonia (1918); Eleanor Porter, Oh, Money!  Oh, Money (1918); Mary Roberts 
Rinehart, The Amazing Interlude (1918); Booth Tarkington, The Magnificent 
Ambersons (1918); Emerson Hough, The Passing of the Frontier (1918);  
E. Phillips Oppenheim, The Pawns Count (1918); Robert Chambers, The Restless 
Sex (1918); Temple Bailey, The Tin Soldier (1918); Zane Grey, The U.P. Trail 
(1918); Treat ‘Em Rough, Ring Lardner (1918); Margaret Atherton, The 
Avalanche (1919); Elizabeth von Arnim, Christopher and Columbus (1919); 
Mary Roberts Rinehart, Dangerous Days (1919); Gene Porter, Dawn (1919); 
Winston Churchill, Dr. Jonathan (1919); Frannie Hurst, Humoresque (1919); 
Robert Chambers, In Secret (1919); James Cabell, Jurgen (1919); Albert Terhune, 
Lad, A Dog (1919); Ethel Dell, The Lamp in the Desert (1919); Joseph 
Hergesheimer, Linda Condon (1919); Joseph Conrad, The Arrow of Gold (1919); 
Irving Bachellor, A Man for the Ages (1919); Ellen Glasgow, The Builders 
(1919); Harold Wright, The Re-Creation of Brian Kent (1919); James Curwood, 
The River’s End (1919); Emerson Hough, The Sagebrusher (1919); Ralph 
Connor, The Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land (1919); Sherwood Anderson, 
Winesburg, Ohio (1919); Edith Wharton, The Age of Innocence (1920); Kathleen 
Norris, Harriet and the Piper (1920); Peter Kyne, Kindred of the Dust (1920); 
Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (1920); Eleanor Porter, Mary-Marie (1920); Zona 
Gale, Miss Lulu Bett (1920); Floyd Dell, Moon Calf (1920); James Huneker, 
Painted Veils (1920); Sherwood Anderson, Poor White (1920); Mary Roberts 
Rinehart, A Poor Wise Man (1920); E. Phillips Oppenheim, The Great 
Impersonation (1920); Zane Grey, The Man of the Forest (1920); Joseph Lincoln, 
The Portygee (1920); Anne Sedgwick, The Third Window (1920); Francis 
Fitzgerald, This Side of Paradise (1920); James Curwood, The Valley of Silent 
Men (1920); Booth Tarkington, Alice Adams (1921); Ben Hecht, Erik Dorn 
(1921); Harold Bell Wright, Helen of the Old House (1921); Gene Porter, Her 
Father’s Daughter (1921); A.S.M. Hutchinson, If Winter Comes (1921); Brian 
Donne-Byrne, Messer Marco Polo (1921); Rafael Sabatini, Saramouche (1921); 
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Ring Lardner, The Big Town (1921); Dorothy Fisher, The Brimming Cup (1921); 
Eden Phillpotts, The Grey Room (1921); Coningsby Dawson, The Kingdom 
Round the Corner (1921); Louis Hemon, Maria Chapdelaine (1921); Zane Grey, 
The Mysterious Rider (1921); Don Marquis, The Old Soak (1921); Willa Cather, 
One of Ours (1921); Edith Hull, The Sheik (1921); Gertrude Atherton, The Sisters 
in Law (1921); Sherwood Anderson, The Triumph of the Egg (1921); John Passos, 
Three Soldiers (1921); Sinclair Lewis, Babitt (1922); Thomas Stribling, Birthright 
(1922); Booth Tarkington, Gentle Julia (1922); Carl Vechten, Peter Whiffle 
(1922); Robert Keable, Simon Called Peter (1922); Francis Fitzgerald, The 
Beautiful and the Damned (1922); Mary Roberts Rinehart, The Breaking Point 
(1922); Raphael Sabatini, Captain Blood (1922); Emerson Hough, The Covered 
Wagon (1922); Temple Bailey, The Dim Lantern (1922); Elizabeth von Arnim, 
The Enchanted April (1922); Edward Cummings, The Enormous Room (1922); 
Frances Burnett, The Head of the House of Coombe (1922); A.S.M. Hutchinson, 
This Freedom (1922); James Joyce, Ulysses (1922); Herbert Quick, Vandermark’s 
Folly (1922); Christopher Morley, Where the Blue Begins (1922). 
 
Copyrighted Works (1923-1932) 
Willa Cather, A Lost Lady (1923); Gertrude Atherton, Black Oxen (1923); Phillip 
Gibbs, The Heirs Apparent (1923); Arthur Train, His Children’s Children (1923); 
Elliot Paul, Impromptu (1923); Mazo de la Roche, Jalna (1923); John Dos Passos, 
Streets of Night (1923); Margaret Wilson, The Able McLaughlins (1923); Robert 
Chambers, The Hijackers (1923); Harold Bell Wright, The Mine with the Iron 
Door (1923); Zane Grey, The Wanderer of the Wasteland (1923); James Oliver 
Curwood, A Gentleman of Courage (1924); Margaret Kennedy, The Constant 
Nymph (1924); Will James, Cowboys, North and South (1924); Michael Arlen, 
The Green Hat (1924); Clarence Mulford, Hopalong Cassidy Returns (1924); 
Ernest Hemingway, In Our Time (1924); Emerson Hough, Mother of Gold 
(1924); Edith Wharton, Old New York (1924); Edna Ferber, So Big (1924); 
Coningsby Dawson, The Coast of Folly (1924); Louis Bromfield, The Green Bay 
Tree (1924); Dorothy Fisher (1924); Anne Douglas Sedgwick, The Little French 
Girl (1924); Booth Tarkington, The Midlander (1924); Percy Marks, The Plastic 
Age (1924); Robert Herrick, Waste (1924); Theodore Dreiser, An American 
Tragedy (1925); Sinclair Lewis, Arrowsmith (1925); Ellen Glasgow, Barren 
Ground (1925); PC Wren, Beau Geste (1924); Sherwood Anderson, Dark 
Laughter (1925); James Boyd, Drums (1925); Anita Loos, Gentlemen Prefer 
Blondes (1925); E. Barrington, Glorious Apollo (1925); John Dos Passos, 
Manhattan Transfer (1925); ASM Hutchinson, One Increasing Purpose (1925); 
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Robert Benchley, Pluck and Luck (1925); DuBose Heyward, Porgy (1925); John 
Erskine, The Private Life of Helen of Troy (1925); A. Hamilton Gibbs, Soundings 
(1925); Rafael Sabatini, The Carolinian (1925); Francis Scott Fitzgerald, The 
Great Gatsby (1925); Gene Stratton Porter, The Keeper of the Bees (1925); 
Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans (1925); Anne Parrish, The Perennial 
Bachelor (1925); Willa Cather, The Professor’s House (1925); Christopher 
Morley, Thunder on the Left (1925); Susan Ertz, After Noon (1925); PC Wren, 
Beau Sabreur (1926); Louis Bromfield, Early Autumn (1926); Dorothy Canfield, 
Her Son’s Wife (1926); Carl Van Vechten, Nigger Heaven (1926); Zona Gale, 
Preface to a Life (1926); Edna Ferber, Show Boat (1926); William Faulkner, 
Soldier’s Pay (1926); Warwick Deeping, Sorrell and Son (1926); Thomas 
Stribling, Teeftallow (1926); Temple Bailey, The Blue Window (1926); Sylvia 
Thompson, The Hounds of Spring (1926); Ellen Glasgow, The Romantic 
Comedians (1926); John Galsworthy, The Silver Spoon (1926); James Branch 
Cabell, The Silver Stallion (1926); Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises 
(1926); Elizabeth Roberts, The Time of Man (1926); Thorne Smith, Topper 
(1926); A.A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh (1926); Louis Bromfield, A Good Woman 
(1927); Julia Peterkin, Black April (1927); Conrad Aiken, Blue Voyage (1927); 
Thornton Wilder, The Bridge of San Luis Rey (1927); Willa Cather, Death Comes 
for the Archbishop (1927); Warwick Deeping, Doomsday (1927); Sinclair Lewis, 
Elmer Gantry (1927); Honore Willsie Morrow, Forever Free (1927); Ole 
Rolvaag, Giants in the Earth (1927); Mary Roberts Rinehart, Lost Ecstasy (1927); 
James Boyd, Marching On (1927); Ernest Hemingway, Men Without Women 
(1927); Glenway Westcott, The Grandmothers (1927); Don Marquis, The Lives 
and Times of Archy Mehitabel (1927); Anne Douglas Sedgwick, The Old 
Countess (1927); Booth Tarkington, The Plutocrat (1927); Anne Parrish, 
Tomorrow Morning (1927); Edith Wharton, Twilight Sleep (1927); Fannie Hurst, 
A President is Born (1928); Anne Parrish, All Kneeling (1928); Vina Delmar, Bad 
Girl (1928); Booth Tarkington, Claire Ambler (1928); H.W. Freeman, Joseph and 
his Brethren (1928); Honore Willsie Morrow, Mary Todd Lincoln (1928); Roark 
Bradford, Ol Man Adam n His Chillun (1928); Warwick Deeping, Old Pybus 
(1928); Julia Peterkin, Scarlet Sister Mary (1928); John Galsworthy, Swan Song 
(1928); S.S. Van Dine, The Greene Murder Case (1928); Louis Bromfield Stokes, 
The Strange Case of Miss Annie Spragg (1928); Hugh Walpole, Wintersmoon 
(1928); Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (1929); Erich Maria Remarque, 
All Quiet on the Western Front (1929); Anne Douglas Sedgwick, Dark Hester 
(1929); Sinclair Lewis, Dodsworth (1929); James Thurber, Is Sex Necessary? 
(1929); Oliver LaFarge, Laughing Boy (1929); Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward, 
Angel (1929); Lloyd Douglas, Magnificent Obsession (1929); DuBose Heyward, 
Mamba’s Daughters (1929); O.E. Rolvaag, Peder Victorious (1929); Warwick 
Deeping, Reaper’s Row (1929); Ellen Glasgow, They Stooped to Folly (1929); SS 
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Van Dine, The Bishop Murder Case (1929); Susan Glaspell, The Fugitives Return 
(1929); Susan Ertz, The Galaxy (1929); Ellery Queen, The Roman Hat Mystery 
(1929); William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (1929); Susan Glaspell, 
Alison’s House (1930); J.B. Priestly, Angel Pavement (1930); Kenneth Roberts, 
Arundel (1930); A. Hamilton Gibbs, Chances (1930); Edna Ferber, Cimarron 
(1930); Warwick Deeping, Exile (1930); Katherine Anne Porter, Flowering Judas 
(1930); Vicki Baum, Grand Hotel (1930); Michael Gold, Jews Without Money 
(1930); D.H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1930); William McFee, North 
of Suez (1930); Hugh Walpole, Rogue Herries (1930); John Dos Passos, The 42
nd
 
Parallel (1930); Arthur Train, The Adventures of Ephraim Tutt (1930); Mary 
Roberts Rinehart, The Door (1930); Elizabeth Madox Roberts, The Great 
Meadow (1930); Dashiell Hammett, The Maltese Falcon (1930); Thornton 
Wilder, The Woman of Andros (1930); Honore Willsie Morrow, Tiger! Tiger! 
(1930); Louis Bromfield, Twenty-Four Hours (1930); Margaret Ayer Barnes, 
Years of Grace (1930); Katharine Brush, Young Man of Manhattan (1930); Bess 
Streeter Aldrich, A White Bird Flying (1931);  Susan Glaspell, Ambrose Holt and 
Family (1931); Fannie Hurst, Back Street (1931); Honore Willsie Morrow, Black 
Daniel (1931); Mazo de la Roche, Finch’s Fortune (1931); William McFee, The 
Harbourmaster (1931); John Galsworthy, Maid in Waiting (1931); William 
Faulkner, Sanctuary (1931); Willa Cather, Shadows on the Rock (1931); Warwick 
Deeping, The Bridge of Desire (1931); Thomas Stribling, The Forge (1931); Pearl 
Buck The Good Earth (1931); Ernest Hergesheimer, The Limestone Tree (1931); 
Thorne Smith, The Night Life of the Gods (1931); Erich Maria Remarque, The 
Road Back (1931); Ole Rolvaag, Their Fathers’ God (1931); Sherwood 
Anderson, Beyond Desire (1932); Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932); Julia 
Peterkin, Bright Skin (1932); Vardis Fisher, In Tragic Life (1932); Phyllis 
Bentley, Inheritance (1932); Louis Golding, Magnolia Street (1932); Booth 
Tarkington, Mary’s Neck (1932); Charles Barnard Nordoff, Mutiny on the Bounty 
(1932); Warwick Deeping, Old Wine and New (1932); Pearl Buck, Sons (1932); 
Phillip Stong, State Fair (1932); Thorne Smith, The Bishop’s Jaegers (1932); 
Robert Herrick, The End of Desire (1932); Charles Morgan, The Fountain (1932); 
Ellen Glasgow, The Sheltered Life (1932); Thomas Stribling, The Store (1932); 
AJ Cronin, Three Loves (1932); Erskine Caldwell, Tobacco Road (1932); Sinclair 
Lewis, Ann Vickers (1933); Hervey Allen, Anthony Adverse (1933); Gladys 
Carroll, As the Earth Turns (1933); Lloyd Douglas, Forgive us our Trespasses 
(1933); Erskine Caldwell, God’s Little Acre (1933); Caroline Miller, Lamb in his 
Bosom (1933); Hans Fallada, Little Man, What Now? (1933); Bess Streeter 
Aldrich, Miss Bishop (1933); William McFee, No Castle in Spain (1933); John 
Galsworthy, One More River (1933); Robert Herrick, One More Spring (1933); 
Philip Stong, Stranger’s Return (1933); Louis Bromfield, The Farm (1933); Mazo 
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de la Roche, The Master of Jalna (1933); Ernest Hemingway, Winner Take 
Nothing (1933). 
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APPENDIX B: DURABLE FICTION BESTSELLERS, 1913-1932 
 
Public Domain Durable Works 
 
Sherwood Anderson, Winesburg, Ohio (1919); Edgar Burroughs, Tarzan of the 
Apes (1914); Willa Cather, My Ántonia (1918); Willa Cather, O Pioneers! (1913); 
Willa Cather, The Song of the Lark (1915); F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and 
the Damned (1922); F. Scott Fitzgerald, This Side of Paradise (1920); Zane Grey, 
The Lone Star Ranger (1915); James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (1916); James Joyce, Dubliners (1914); James Joyce, Ulysses (1922); D.H. 
Lawrence, Sons and Lovers (1913); Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (1920); Sinclair 
Lewis, Babbitt (1922); W. Somerset Maugham, Of Human Bondage (1915); 
Eleanor H. Porter, Pollyanna (1913); Rafael Sabatini, Captain Blood (1922); 
Rafael Sabatini, Scaramouche (1921); Booth Tarkington, The Magnificent 
Ambersons (1918); Edith Wharton, The Age of Innocence (1920).   
 
 
Copyrighted Durable Works 
 
Pearl S. Buck, The Good Earth (1931); Willa Cather, Death Comes for the 
Archbishop (1927); John Dos Passos, Manhattan Transfer (1925); Theodore 
Dreiser, An American Tragedy (1925); William Faulkner, Sanctuary (1931); 
William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (1929); F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great 
Gatsby (1925); Dashiell Hammett, The Maltese Falcon (1930); Ernest 
Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (1929); Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises 
(1926); Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932); D.H. Lawrence, Lady 
Chatterley's Lover (1930); Sinclair Lewis, Arrowsmith (1925); Sinclair Lewis, 
Elmer Gantry (1927); A.A. Milne, Winnie-The-Pooh (1926); Charles Nordhoff, 
Mutiny on the Bounty (1932); Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western 
Front (1929); Thornton Wilder, The Bridge of San Luis Rey (1927); Thomas 
Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (1929); Percival Christopher Wren, Beau Geste 
(1925). 
 
